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Social Justice, Social Norms and
the Governance of Social Media
Tal Z. Zarsky*
I.

Introduction and Background: Re-Introducing Four Forms
of Governance

Digital media generate a technological environment which
allows for, and at times even creates, a thriving social
discourse. The dynamics unfolding throughout these networks
– sometimes referred to as “social media” – enhance important
autonomy-related rights such as freedom of speech, expression
and association. Yet the rich information flows enabled by
these applications also generate abuses and social wrongs to
both those participating in the discourse and external parties.
They do so by enhancing speech-related torts, privacy breaches,
IP infringements and other problems.
In response to the challenges posed by these realms,
various forms of governance have arisen: rules that detail
conduct which is permitted and forbidden throughout these
digital settings, as well as an apparatus to enforce them.1 The
role of formulating and applying governance was usually
* Professor, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law. I thank my Israeli and
German co-researchers in the multi-year project, which produced the findings
here discussed, for their cooperation, as well as for their thoughts regarding
many of the ideas here noted: Niva Elkin-Koren, Wolfgang Schulz, Gustavo
Mesch, Jan-Hinrik Schmidt, Martin Lose and Marcus Oermann. I also thank
Ilan Saban for his insights and Rotem Medzini for his contribution to this
project. I further thank Ayelet Oz and Malte Ziewitz for participating in a
workshop devoted to this project, and held at the University of Haifa. In
addition, I thank Eyal Mashbetz and Jordan Scheyer for their research
assistance. Finally, I thank Leslie Garfield and the organizers of the "Social
Media and Social Justice" Symposium at Pace Law School for their comments
and hospitality. This study received generous initial funding from the
Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (Berlin).
1. For a recent discussion of the concept of governance in this, and the
broader, context, see Markus Oermann et al., Approaching Social Media
Governance (HIIG Discussion Paper No. 2014-05 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498552.
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vested in the state, but the term no longer pertains exclusively
to the acts of government.2 Instead, the online environment
creates other interesting options. It introduces governance
measures applied through the internal actions of the private
and commercial platforms which operate the relevant digital
platforms.
The digital media platforms’ ability to engage in
governance is manifested on several levels. Most prominently,
the platforms control the technological architecture, which they
create and amend at will. In this technological setting the
platforms can take active steps that directly impact their users
within the social media: they can limit the possible interactions
users might engage in, or the information they can review or
distribute.
They can also apply their control of the
architectural design to impose sanctions, which might vary
from warnings, through content deletion and even to account
termination. In other words, the platforms can engage in
governance by code.3
These somewhat aggressive governance steps are further
enabled by the Terms of Use, accepted (at least formally) by the
social media users when they begin their virtual activity across
the platform. Such terms are often considered to be part of a
formal contractual agreement between the user and the
platform operator.4 In other words, the actions carried out
through code are backed by the contractual language governing
the relation of platform users with controllers. Furthermore,
2. See IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD
GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 12, 126
(William J. Drake & Ernest J. Wilson III eds., 2013) (noting that the origins
of the term "governance" lie in discussions of "self-regulation").
3. This phrase is clearly borrowed. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). A similar idea was raised by Joel
Reidenberg. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998). For
a recent discussion of this element, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 10.
See also discussion of this concept by Margaret Radin, who refers to it as
"machine rule." MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 47 (2013).
4. These agreements are in fact standard form contracts which present a
specific set of concerns in general and in the online environment in
particular. See generally Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract
Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User
Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303 (2008).
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the contractual framework immunizes platforms from future
claims regarding the legitimacy of their actions.
When
platforms act on the basis of these legal documents they are
thereby governing by contract.
At first glance these two methods of governance (through
code and through contract) dominate the social media realm.5
Seemingly, decisions regarding governance are exclusively
vested in a single, private and powerful intermediary. This
private actor governs disputes and limits harms unilaterally
and at its own discretion through the contracts drafted by its
lawyers and the code written by its engineers. So prima facie at
least, the situation portrayed here is problematic, and might
even promote unfairness and injustice. The notion that a small
group of managers (who presumably control the engineers and
lawyers) unilaterally set the rules regulating the social
discourse is daunting. It seems to furnish an alarming example
of the “outsourcing” of important social choices. This is
especially true when these rules impact users’ core rights –
such as their ability to engage in free speech or invoke privacy.
While the individuals vested with the power to make such
governance-based decisions might be talented and even
qualified to do so, they will be mostly driven by financial
incentives and will strive to boost their firms’ bottom line, thus
blazing the trail to normatively unacceptable outcomes.
This dynamic, one might argue, is in sharp contrast to
governance by law: the prospect of governing conduct in these
virtual spaces on the basis of laws and regulations. The
foundations of such governance are quite different.6 They are
set out by governments and legislators. These public actors are
perceived as the representatives of the broader public and

5. To a great extent, regulations via contract and via code are grouped
together in this article. However, fundamental differences between the two
exist. For instance, in some cases governance via code regulates behavior ex
ante, as opposed to enforcing contracts, which regulates behavior ex post. In
addition, regulation via code can in some cases enable "perfect enforcement,"
which is unavailable through other models of governance. These distinctions
are beyond the scope of our current discussion. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 109 (2008).
6. RADIN, supra note 3, at 36 (explaining the difference between
governance by law and by contract, while noting that the latter erase the
safeguards of the polity).
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promote their interests and preferences. Indeed, laws govern
some of the situations arising in social media (through privacy
and IP laws), although the governance choices set forth in this
manner are at times circumvented or ignored.7
That said, governance by contract or code might not be as
bad as it sounds. One can convincingly argue that these forms
of governance are in fact a reflection of the platform users’
normative preferences. These are signaled to the platform
operators by means of the various feedback mechanisms
(formal and informal) that the technological environment
provides. If such signaling is indeed unfolding, social media are
largely, and at least by proxy, still governed by the users’ social
norms. Yet rather than reflecting the public’s values as set
forth in an election process, it reflects norms as signaled by the
public in the open market.8
The question whether forms of governance by “code” and
“contract” are aligned with the users’ social norms is therefore
crucial. The answer might provide important insights into the
need for further regulation of the social media realm. If “code,”
“contract” and “social norms” are all indeed aligned, social
media might not require substantial governance by law, absent
specific normative justifications. And regardless of this issue,
regulating social media by government has several evident
disadvantages. Governments are ill-equipped to deal with legal
challenges arising at the cutting edge of the technological
environment in which social media develop. In addition, like
any other highly complex regulatory process that relies on
external feedback, the regulatory process might be tainted by
political interests and lobbying.9 Accordingly, many benefits
might follow if the public’s preferences could be met without
direct government intervention.
Against this, a variety of convincing arguments could be
made that only governance by government can achieve fairness
7. Anne-Marie Zell, Data Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany
and the European Union: An Unequal Playing Field, 15 GERMAN L. J. 461
(2014) (discussing how Facebook.com escaped regulation by law in Germany).
8. Here one might argue that these two sets of preferences need not be
identical. See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 128 (2009).
9. See Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy:
Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439,
440 (2011) (for a brief discussion of the central arguments in this context).
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and justice at this juncture, given inherent market and other
failures.10
The analytical discussion as to whether the
governance of social media via “contract” or “code” (as opposed
to “law”) should be considered harmful, reasonable, or perhaps
even beneficial, is extremely complex. There are seemingly
convincing arguments to be made on both sides – those calling
for more governmental intervention and those calling for less.
In an attempt to introduce yet another important insight into
this crucial debate, recent empirical studies have begun
exploring the relations among the foregoing forms of
governance.
This article reports an initial discussion of
findings produced by a team of legal scholars and sociologists
from Germany and Israel (in which the author had the
privilege of participating) which approached this empirical
challenge.11 The empirical study is to some extent a much
needed extension of the theoretical work originally done by
Lawrence Lessig. In his seminal 1999 book Code, Lessig
identified “code,” “law,” “markets” and “social norms” as the
key forces which shape and regulate the online environment.12
This joint empirical study strives to develop tools to measure
and thus compare the four somewhat abstract concepts, while
focusing on their role in governance and the context of social
media.
The empirical study aimed to achieve its objective by
developing and applying a complex and multidisciplinary
methodology which strives to measure and compare the four
forms of governance.13 Among other things it formulated and
applied tailored online surveys to establish the nature of social
norms in the social and technological setting and context
discussed here. This article will focus on a portion of this
survey’s findings, and provide an initial discussion of its
results. Given the numerous factors this study entails, the
preliminary test case under discussion here examines a specific
10. Id.
11. GUSTAVO MESCH & JAN SCHMIDT, PRIVACY-RELATED ATTITUDES AND
PRACTICES ON FACEBOOK (Oct. 2013) (Joint Report Germany-Israel) (on file
with author). For a discussion of other elements of this study, see generally,
Oermann et al., supra note 1.
12. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 88.
13. For an additional discussion as to how this methodology integrates
these factors, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 8.
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issue: a subset of privacy governance on the Facebook
website.14 Resting on the study’s findings, this article will
extrapolate to the broader issues of fair and just governance,
and strive to shed some light on this emerging debate.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part II
briefly addresses the theoretical arguments regarding the pros
and cons of various governance strategies, focusing on the
advantages, disadvantages and pitfalls of reliance on private
parties. In Part III, the article describes, in general terms, the
above-mentioned empirical study, explaining its methodology,
the specific challenges to its design and implementation, and
how these were met. The discussion specifically centers on a
survey taken to establish the nature of social norms. Part IV
presents a specific test case: whether pseudonymity should be
permitted in social media or should “real names” be mandatory.
Part V briefly discusses insights that the “real names” test case
might provide for the broader questions regarding justice and
fairness in social media governance. The article concludes with
yet another context, the “right to be forgotten,” which might
provide additional insights into the important research
questions this project and others begin to address. It further
notes additional extensions of the methodological design this
article introduces.
An important caveat is due. While the article strives to
argue a normative point as to the fair, just and proper way to
govern social media, it draws on empirical findings regarding
users’ actual social norms. Clearly, however, there are
numerous examples of situations demonstrating descriptive
social norms to which can hardly be considered a normative
baseline to aspire. In fact social norms embraced by the
majority might reflect prejudice, errors and the inability to
adapt to social changes. In some instances, especially those
pertaining to information privacy,15 the “crowd” might not be
wise at all.16 For these reasons, the policy implications and
14. For a discussion of a different subset of this study, one that focuses
on the posting and dissemination of photos on Facebook, see Oermann et al.,
supra note 1.
15. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883-88 (2013).
16. For a popular discussion of such instances in the general context see
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recommendations to be derived from the discussion that follows
are noted carefully, and must be subjected to additional
considerations and scrutiny.
Nevertheless, establishing
whether governance methods, as applied in these innovative
settings, are objectively fair and just, is extremely difficult if
not impossible. Thus, reliance on imperfect proxies such as the
nature of “social norms” will surely prove constructive.
Therefore, examining the differences between these four
subsets of governance (“code,” “contract,” “law,” and “social
norms”) can provide us with insights into the “justice” of the
governance administered by the platform provider and address
the nuances of this intriguing reality.
II. Governance by Government / Governance by Firms:
Benefits and Detriments
A. General Intuitions
Social media provide a fertile ground for promoting
important social objectives.
They might also generate
substantial harms in the form of speech-related torts. Other
forms of media, such as broadcast TV and radio, have
traditionally been subjected to a comprehensive regulatory
framework.17 Yet the aggressive “command and control” form
of regulation which was often applied to these latter contexts is
in an overall decline.18 Other methods are gaining favor,19 such
as co-regulation (which involves a joint effort by both
government and industry),20 applying codes of conduct21 and

MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 72
(2005) (addressing among other things the election of Warren Harding as
U.S. President – according to some, the worst president ever elected).
17. See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL
CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE
239 (2005) ("the FCC's spectrum management regime remains an exemplar of
'command and control' regulation.”).
18. Id. (discussing the move "beyond command-and-control").
19. See BROWN & MARSDEN, supra note 2, at 2-3.
20. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 465.
21. MONROE E. PRICE & STEFAAN G. VERHULST, SELF-REGULATION AND THE
INTERNET (2005).
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self-regulation.22 The argument for these latter forms of
regulation is especially strong in technological realms, where
expertise is mostly found outside of government.23
In respect of social media, the regulatory frameworks
discussed here will practically always pertain to private
entities currently operating these media realms. Applying
aggressive governmental regulation to such private entities is
not a step to be taken lightly. Furthermore, and as opposed to
regulatory issues involving the media in the past, the
operational environment is not one considered “public” by
nature (such as TV and radio making use of the
electromagnetic spectrum)24 or among those that benefited
from massive governmental subsidies and other privileges in
the past (such as telecom or cable operators).25 So it should
come as no surprise that government largely shied away from
extensively regulating of social media. Instead, governance of
these realms was conducted by the private parties themselves.
Yet one can easily formulate arguments for greater
governmental intervention, among other ways through
governance, in social media. Such arguments could be set on
both an intuitive and an analytical level. Intuitively, the
notion that decisions regarding the public’s privacy- and
speech-related rights (and others) be left to private, for-profit
entities is, on the face of it, unacceptable.26 It is for the
government, one would immediately and categorically declare,
to decide the extent of these rights given their foundational
importance.
On a deeper, analytical, level, one might claim (1) that
government alone can furnish the governance and rule-making
22. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 440; ZITTRAIN, supra note 5, at 152.
23. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 440.
24. See STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND
POLICY 30 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that the spectrum is closely regulated by
government because it presumably "owns" it, but ultimately explaining that
this intrusive level of regulation is justified for other reasons).
25. Arguably, this logic should apply to the internet as well, as it
resulted from various projects funded by the U.S. Defense Department or
other academic sources. However, this argument, which is something of a
stretch factually, might pertain to the internet's current infrastructure but
hardly to the software tools used in popular social media today.
26. See LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE
170 (2014).
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process with proper checks and balances; and (2) that
government alone acts as the legitimate representative of the
people, therefore only the governance structure erected by the
state may be applied.27 Let us examine and closely scrutinize
these two general arguments.
B. The (Perceived) Benefits of a Private “Decider”
The two noted presumptions regarding the superiority and
advantages of government-led governance of social media can
be challenged. First, let us turn to the notion of checks and
balances that government, as opposed to the firm, is able to
provide. In some settings which relate to digital media this
presumption need not prove true. It is the firm, rather than
the government, that benefits from greater insulation against
unwanted pressures, and can reach proper decisions –
decisions which can prove efficient, fair and just. For instance,
in a recent thoughtful and provocative essay titled “The
Deciders,” Jeffery Rosen seriously considers the idea that the
firm, rather than the government, is best suited for handling
decisions on the governance of discourse in social media.28 In
doing so, Rosen introduces “The Decider”: Google’s deputy
general counsel (at the time), Nicole Wong.
During her tenure at Google, Wong (who later moved from
Google to Twitter, and is currently working for the White
House)29 was vested with the authority to decide “what goes up
or comes down” on Google’s various sites – including the
popular video sharing site, YouTube. Rosen reviews Ms. Wong’s
actions favorably, commenting that she was “essentially
codifying” the protection of free speech as opposed to both
oppressive and even Western governments that at times
suppressed it. In other words, Rosen explains that some firms,
27. See BROWN & MARSDEN, supra note 2 (quoting former French
President Nicolas Sarkozy). See a similar point made by RADIN, supra note 3,
at 36.
28. Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech
in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525 (2012(.
29. See Office of Science and Technology: Leadership & Staff, THE WHITE
HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/about/leadershipstaff
(last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
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especially those that are considerably wealthy, are not bound to
succumb to internal and external pressures, while governments
often are. This might be especially true of multinational firms,
which enjoy substantial power when facing pressures from
local politicians. Governments, on the other hand, might at
times strive to limit their citizen’s speech so to achieve various
objectives.
So in such cases, the firm rather than the
government might be the body whose conduct is closer to its
users’ normative preferences.
Rosen concludes his analysis on a more somber note. He
recognizes that firm-based decision-making on crucial issues
related to free speech and other important human rights is
unstable; in the long run, it is uncertain whether the firms and
the platform they constructed can withstand commercial
Rosen therefore concludes: “a user-generated
pressures.30
system for enforcing community standards will never protect
speech as scrupulously as unelected judges enforcing strict
rules.” In other words, firm-based governance has its limits
and the state must, ultimately, step in.
Rosen’s final assertion can be critiqued. While judges
might “scrupulously” enforce rules, they may lack the training
and understanding as to how that is done in the context of
cutting-edge technologies.31 Moreover, by the time an issue
reaches the courts it might be of limited relevance given the
slow response time of the judiciary. Finally, judges too are
subject to local pressures and of course local law. Hence
Rosen’s initial endorsement of the firm’s governance authority
might still be with merit, and the first argument promoting
state governance is not without problems. Therefore, it is
advisable to continue seeking the problematic aspects of
governance by firms in this specific context.
C. Governance by Code and Contract: “Top-Down” or “BottomUp”?
As noted above, one might argue that regulation via code
30. Rosen, supra note 28, at 1527.
31. For a similar discussion see Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto Nuno Gomes
de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: The “Soft eID”
Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1397 (2013).
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or contract is unacceptable as it merely reflects the position of
the firm, rather than that of the public. Yet the firm-based
governance dynamics unfolding in the social media need not
fail to represent the thoughts and preferences of the people.
The process whereby the platform formulates its strategy for
both “code”- and “contract”-based governance need not be
strictly “top-down” but could involve a “bottom-up” flow of
information.32 The latter process might take several forms. It
might be explicit, in which case users will debate the form of
proper rules and agree on a framework eventually
implemented by the firm. Hence the governance then adopted
will be an extension of the public’s preferences. This dynamic
is indeed part of Wikipedia’s governance structure.33 Still,
Wikipedia is admittedly the exception rather than the rule for
entities operating in the social media space. Such direct user
influence is in fact rare.
Alternatively, users might impact the firm’s governance
practices indirectly and implicitly. This dynamic could unfold
through the users’ complaints and interaction with the firm,
while using Web 2.0 tools. For instance, on occasion social
media firms such as Google and Facebook have offered novel
services which their users found unacceptable. After vocal
complaints and debates these firms changed their policy and
technology to meet users’ demands.34
Yet this claim regarding a persistent and sustainable
“bottom-up” dynamic in social media must be taken with more
than a grain of salt: the existence of “bottom-up” feedback loop
32. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 34 (explaining that public ordering is a
top bottom process and private ordering – bottom-up).
33. See Wikipedia: Policies and Guidelines, WIKIPEDIA (last modified
Sept.
13,
2014
4:43
AM),
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines#Life_cycle.
See discussion of this example of self-regulation and governance in ZITTRAIN,
supra note 5, at 143-46.
34. For a discussion of ten such instances which pertained to Google and
Facebook, see Ira Rubinstein & Nathan Good, Privacy by Design: A
Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1377-1406 (2013). See similar discussion in Robert
Brendan Taylor, Consumer-Driven Changes to Online Form Contracts, 67
N.Y.U ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371 (2011-2012( (generally examining what
triggered the firm's "capitulation" to social pressures which led to changes in
their contracts and practices).
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is supported by no empirical evidence. Rubinstein’s and Good’s
analysis of privacy fiascos involving Google and Facebook
illustrates a variety of responses by firms in such cases.
Sometimes firms have made minor changes to benefit their
users; sometimes they have quietly weathered the storm of
criticism but have done nothing in practice. And of course, in
specific cases firms have made substantial changes in their
policy and practices.35 Yet these latter cases are merely
anecdotal and cannot prove the existence of a systematic
pattern of governance. An additional study found similar
results.36 Therefore, at present it is difficult to assert that the
governance structure offered by firms is one to which their
users substantially contribute. However, the firm’s governance
might also be a reflection of users’ preferences (and not only
their own) given various economic forces impacting the firms’
actions – a notion the article now moves to discuss, applying
thereto previous legal discussions which addressed remarkably
similar premises.
D. Social Media and Economic Forces, or Nanny Corporations
and Virtual Company Towns
It is possible that firms are in fact adequately responding
to the bottom-up pressures of their users as part of a broader
response to market signals, and are doing so appropriately,
without direct government intervention. This different set of
arguments regarding the pros and cons of government - and
firm-based governance models is rooted in the “Law and
Economics” literature, especially its analysis of “nanny
corporations.” Todd Henderson set forth a comprehensive
argument as to the advantages of governing by the decisions of
corporate entities, as opposed to those of government.37 It
should be noted that this law and economics-based discussion
mostly addresses the fears that firm’s will adopt “paternalistic”
35. Rubenstein & Good, supra note 34, at 1405-06.
36. See Taylor, supra note 34, at 392 (finding that when examining such
events involving social pressures and privacy breaches, the firms' actions "did
not frequently result in capitulation.”).
37. See M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1517 (2009).
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norms, so to speak, which are stricter than those the public
finds necessary.38 However, with some alternations, it could be
applied to the context at hand, which addresses a broad array
of instances in which public opinions and rules set by firms
diverge.
Social media websites are a relatively new dynamic, yet
this discussion of firm governance was already discussed in the
past. A common context of governance discussions in the
literature is the “company towns” of former times: residential
areas built and operated by firms for their employees.39 The
resident/employee living in such a town was required to abide
by the local rules, which at times included monitoring and
restrictions of various behaviors.40 In other words, in company
towns individuals were subject to governance by the firm in
almost all areas of their lives – including those pertaining to
basic human rights and values. The company town, in its
classic format, rarely exists in the U.S. today. Still, one can
easily argue that social media are a modern variation of this
older concept.
On its face, the firms’ should be motivated to respond to
their users (or employees) preferences. However, governance
by nanny corporations might lead to problematic outcomes – a
lesson we might want to carry over to the present. Henderson
recognizes two reasons for errors (and thus, inefficiencies)
which might follow from the governing initiatives of the firm:
miscalculating the potentially negative consequences of
restricting individual liberties, and trying to use their power to
impose selfish and socially costly preferences.41 In other words,
the market forces impacting the firms’ conduct will not
properly account for democratic and other non-monetary
interests.42 Margaret Radin has recently referred to similar
dynamics as “democratic degradation” which follows when
firms displace state regulation.43
Accordingly, for an argument regarding the efficiency and
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1535.
Id. at 1536-37.
Id. at 1532.
Id. at 1583.
RADIN, supra note 3, at 33.
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success of governance by firms to prevail and overcome these
shortcomings, it must be premised on several assumptions and
claims (which Henderson sets forth) which point to the
advantages firms have over governments. Let us examine
three of such assumption and arguments, and their relevance
to the social media context. First, firms are more agile by
nature. They can frequently tailor their relevant policies, and
the impact of such changes will materialize faster.44 They can
also engage in greater experimentation on their way to
achieving an optimal outcome.45 Governmental rules and
restrictions, on the other hand, are sticky. It is also quite
difficult to change a rule once it is put in place.46 This point is
especially pertinent to the present context. Firms can easily
alter governance by changing both the contract and the code
which are both relatively flexible, while the government’s
response will be much slower.
Yet Henderson’s next two assumptions are quite farfetched when applied to our specific context – social media.
Second, Henderson further argues firms are subject to greater
oversight than politicians, therefore are the preferred
nannies;47 and third, that individuals can, with greater ease,
opt out of the relevant firm’s governance. Opting out of the
state’s jurisdiction is far more costly. Thus firms – not
governments – will compete for people’s patronage and
attention, and provide governance rules which are normatively
acceptable to them.
Establishing whether governments or firms are subject to
the greater external oversight in the social media context is
extremely complex. The intuitions noted by Henderson could
be countered. The fact that the social media firms are both
multi-national and powerful renders effective oversight
difficult.
In addition, governments have taken steps to
enhance their transparency – especially with regard to
lobbying activities.48
Therefore, this oversight-based
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
(2011).

See Henderson, supra note 37, at 1561.
Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1561, 1572-73.
Id. at 1534.
See, e.g., MICAH SIFRY, WIKILEAKS AND THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY 73
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assumption is at best speculative in this context. It cannot
provide clear insights into the governance debate at hand.
Perhaps the empirical tests presented below will shed light on
this issue.
The third assumption and claim is even shakier than the
second in the social media context. While opting out of a
jurisdiction is indeed very hard, the current market structure
renders opting out of the relevant contractual framework,
hence out of the social media, almost equally difficult.49 When
users engage in social media, their costs to switch to another
such realm are high. Several lock-in effects also come into
play.50 Furthermore, given the high barriers to entry, in many
instances sufficient alternative platforms might not exist in
social media markets. Again, empirical evidence might prove
helpful in resolving this difficult matter of which realm is
easier to exit.
However, when opting out is of limited
feasibility, firms will have limited incentives to meet the
public’s preferences, and the state will be forced to intervene.
In sum, the social media might prove a poor “corporate nanny”
because the governance applied will presumably be strictly
“top-down” rather than “bottom-up,” given the failure of the
implicit signaling process noted above.
Yet even if (and as noted, in this context it is a very big
“if”) and when Henderson’s three assumptions are met, the
governance laid down by a “nanny corporation,” in a corporate
town or anywhere else, might fail to generate an efficient and
fair framework due to additional signaling failures. As noted,
this might occur with regard to issues pertaining to democratic
values. Such outcomes might result from “collective action”
problems – namely the overall damage from the firm’s conduct
will be enormous, yet quite limited for each particular user who
is unable or unwilling to signal her full discontent.51
In addition, as Cass Sunstein argues, individuals conduct

49. See RADIN, supra note 3, at 40.
50. See Ruben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social Networks: Norms, Markets,
and Natural Monopoly, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND
REPUTATION 237, 246–49 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010);
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 6–8 (2008).
51. Henderson, supra note 37, at 1583.
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themselves quite differently when assuming their role as
consumers as opposed to their role as citizens.52
Thus,
governance by government cannot be supplanted by that of
firms. In their capacity as citizens, individuals hold higher
aspirations regarding the society they would like to live in. As
consumers, they might be merely interested in making the best
deal. While these two forms of behavior might, at times, seem
contradictory they may not be, given people’s different
mindsets when making decisions in these two capacities
(consumers vs. citizens). When deciding on the governance of
social media, which indeed might impact important rights and
values, people’s preferences at the ballot, rather than at the
market (by selecting from various social media for their usage),
should be heard and at times followed. Therefore, governance
should not be left to the firms but must be carried out by the
government directly – as a proxy of the citizen’s relevant
preferences for the issues to be governed. The “bottom-up”
process in establishing a firm’s governance might therefore be
in play, but is still insufficient by nature to reflect all the
relevant and required preferences.
Sunstein’s theory could be sharply critiqued, undermining
the argument for opting for governance by the state rather
than deferring to market forces. One can question if indeed
individuals act differently in these two realms (consumers v.
citizens). Perhaps the individuals’ behavior is nuanced –as
they choose to purposely indicate unachievable aspirations in
the political realm. Therefore, the only signals to be considered
are those indicated when people reflect on realistic options and
“put their money where their mouth is.” Or one might argue
that the market is where people’s true preferences are
reflected. This is as opposed to the political realm, where
limited choices and other systematic distortions encumber one’s
ability to express them properly and effectively. Here again,
the discussion could benefit from empirical testing.
Another potential concern with and caveat to the “bottomup” governance-by-firms process pertains to the multi-national
presence of the firms discussed here. As noted, the firms’
global nature potentially strengthens their ability to reject
52. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 128.
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local pressures, and thus rendering governance by code or
contact an optimal governance option.53 However, one might
argue that a firm’s global presence leads it to also reject the
local specific preferences presented by both government and
users at their specific location. Rather, in order to promote
efficiency, such a firm will opt for standardized global
governance rules, which might merely cater to the majority of
their users, to those in the firm’s country of origin, or to a
common denominator of all user norms set by the firm. In any
event, the governance applied will have limited linkage to the
specific users’ preferences or signaling in any given state.
Thus, one might argue, at least with global firms, actual
governance practices have little to do with the local laws and
social norms, and are almost exclusively governed by the firms’
strategy (which might be quite different) as dictated by both
code and law. Stronger laws with a global reach must be put in
place to assure that the users’ preferences are properly
considered.
However, the global presence of a social media platform
need not mean that it will categorically set aside local laws and
norms. Indeed, firms can and do offer different interfaces54 and
contractual language55 to different users, based on their
geographical location. Given the flexibility of the digital realm,
engaging in governance-by-geographical segmentation is doable
and is indeed unfolding.56 Thus, the firm’s disregard for local
laws and norms cannot necessarily be explained by its global
presence and calls for additional discussion. Still, future
studies should perhaps probe whether the governance
dynamics for global and local platforms present substantial
differences and therefore must be examined separately.

53. See supra Part II.D.
54. See, e.g., Search Removal Request under Data Protection Law in
Europe,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch&hl=en
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (Google's new form for merely EU users, allowing
them to invoke their "right to be forgotten."). See discussion infra note 86
and related text.
55. See, e.g., infra note 91 and relevant text.
56. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2008).
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E. Governance of Firms and Spheres of Justice
As a final step in the analysis of governance methods, let
us set aside efficiency considerations as well as the “law and
economics” perspective, and question the fairness and justice of
allowing firms to govern all elements of our lives – especially
those that relate to crucial rights and values. This argument is
strengthened in instances where the firm’s governance is “topdown” and does not reflect the public’s choices. Again, similar
questions have been raised in the past in the context of the
“company town.” In his important book Spheres of Justice,
Michael Walzer addresses this matter directly. Discussing the
company town of Pullman, Illinois,57 he finds it unacceptable
that a firm could leverage its control over property into control
of people’s lives, in a feudalism-like dynamic. Allowing a small
group of individuals – the company’s executives and owners –
to control the lives of others is unjust. This argument fits well
within Walzer’s broader thesis that power should not be
allowed to migrate and transform from one sphere (in this case
ownership of property) to another (control over other
individuals’ lives).58
Even though Walzer penned this argument over thirty
years ago and in a different context, it could be smoothly
transposed into the social media discussion. Here the firm’s
control over a proprietary website, the related technologies and
relevant IP rights cannot be tantamount to its assuming the
right to dictate the public’s preferences regarding important
rights such as information privacy and free speech. In the
“company town” context, Walzer explains that the firms should
not be allowed to extend their influence beyond the
manufacturing plant and into the employee’s home. In our
context the firms’ influence can extend far beyond thousands of
employees to millions of users impacted by the firm’s
governance strategy.
Such control should therefore be
considered unjust.
Yet the “company town” analogy has its limits. In the case

57. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 295 (1983).
58. Id. passim.
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of Pullman, Illinois, a firm was able substantially to impact its
employees’ physical lives by controlling all aspects round the
clock – with the noted exception of the employee’s important
right and ability to opt out and move away. The social media
are powerful, but nonetheless still virtual. Governing social
media might not necessarily mean that the firms control their
users’ lives in a way deemed unjust. Indeed, courts have
refused to find online realms analogous to “company towns” in
the past for this precise reason, in the context of defining a
“public forum.”59 Perhaps the migration of broader scopes of
our lives (and our personal information) to the virtual world
would lead courts to rethink this analogy, and indeed consider
social media as possibly equivalent to company towns. Should
this occur, the “spheres of justice” argument might be relevant
– and allow for framing the governance problems discussed
here in consideration of the powerful concept of injustice.
In conclusion, on the one hand, the noted theoretical
review of possible justifications for relying on governance set by
a firm (via contract or code) has yielded several interesting
arguments. On the other hand, strong arguments have been
made for setting the firm’s governance initiatives aside and
resting exclusively on governance dictated by the state. Given
the novelty of the situation at hand, the analysis has mostly
adduced arguments voiced in somewhat different contexts.
Neither set of theories could be seamlessly applied to the
virtual realm of social media; each requires some tinkering,
which might weaken their analytical force. In addition, the
basic arguments themselves are at times speculative. It will
therefore be helpful and important to add an empirical element
to this inquiry.
Before proceeding, note that legal scholarship has broadly
addressed the relation of social norms arising in society to law
on the books.60 These studies – most notably the work of
Robert Ellickson – scrutinize the efficiency as well as the
enforcement of these norms as part of an examination of the
59. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace,
20 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1115, 1135-42 (2005) (discussing, among other things,
the Cyber Promotions cases).
60. See discussion in Amitai Aviram, Path Dependence in the
Development of Private Ordering, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 29 (2014).
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dynamic of “private ordering.”61 The analysis above did not
directly address this important strand of work. The reason for
such apparent neglect is that our current discussion is
somewhat removed from this broader theme. With social
media, the norms are mostly dictated and enforced (with
apparent success) by one firm. In addition, the relevant social
context differs from other “private ordering” settings in that it
is not formulated from a great variety of contracts among
parties, but in a one-to-many contractual framework. For
these reasons, many of the insights this weighty literature
might provide are of limited relevance to this article’s focused
discussion, and their examination is left for another day.
III. Fair Governance – An Empirical Perspective
A. General
Beyond the normative analysis discussed, this article notes
four models of governance unfolding in social media: (1) by
code, (2) by contract, (3) by law, (4) by social norms.62 Each
fulfills a role in the overall governance of this novel and
important realm, yet how influential each is, is unclear. As
explained above, reliance on every one of these models
generates both advantages and drawbacks. Studying the
relations among them is therefore interesting and important.
It is interesting to try and establish the similarities and
differences among these very different forms of governance,
because such findings can provide insights into who in fact has
the most substantial effect and thus, de facto, governs the
social media (as well as other online realms). Examining
changes in these governance models might show the
“evolution”63 of overall governance trends in the online realm.
It might also provide explanations as to which external events

61. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
62. For a similar discussion and mapping, see Oermann et. al., supra
note 1, at 8.
63. For a discussion of this issue, see Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross &
Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The Evolution of Privacy and
Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 7 (2013), available
at http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1098&context=jpc.
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cause such changes.
Yet beyond academic interest,
understanding the nature of the interactions among these
governance systems will provide important guidance for
regulators, giving them a better grasp of the best way to
minimize problematic practices and maximize those that
government deems preferable. Policymakers will know which
policy levers are destined to have the greatest effect, and thus
utilize them to promote their various interests. As explained
above, the current study strives to introduce empirical findings
into this theoretical discussion.
B. Overcoming Challenges
Empirically comparing the foregoing four governance
methods presented several challenges, of which three central
ones quickly surfaced. First, the factors to be considered were
numerous.
Secondly, comparing governance models was
extremely difficult. Thirdly, comparing these very different
realms called for ensuring that the same issues could be
addressed by measurable parameters on each of the four
governance dimensions and that the parameters overlapped.
The joint German-Israeli research group addressed these
challenges in several ways. To manage the vast scope of this
research project, the initial study chose to focus on a modest
objective: gathering information on privacy-related issues
pertaining to a leading social media website, namely
Facebook.com. The choice of Facebook for the study is easily
justified, as this specific medium provides invaluable insights
into all four dimensions with relative ease. Facebook generates
a vibrant legal and policy discussion,64 so establishing the
treatment of relevant laws and the governance they imply is
relatively simple. Facebook has both an extensive contractual
and technological (i.e. “code”) framework, which facilitates their
study. And perhaps most importantly, its broad and global
popularity makes for easy generation of surveys to establish
the social norms governing its use. Privacy also seemed to be
an intuitive choice for such a policy-related study, given the
64. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV.
1137 (2009).
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growing interest and concern it is currently generating
worldwide.65
Secondly, to further the comparison of very different
parameters on distinct dimensions (as well as the ability to
address other important issues such as the global effects of
multinational platforms), the study added an extra layer: a
comparative examination of these governance models in two
legal and social systems, Germany and Israel. Both countries
share some relevant traits; their legal systems have some level
of privacy protection, the language used is non-English and
Facebook has a substantial presence, reflected by considerable
usage levels.66 Differences and similarities between these two
countries should provide additional insight into the relations
among the various governance forms.
Furthermore, to
overcome the problem of comparing and measuring governance
through code with other factors, in its first stage the study
chose to rely on instances in which this governance parameter
was constant in the two jurisdictions.
Thirdly, to ensure that the study relied on a set of
measurable and comparable factors for each of the four
governance forms (and in each of the two jurisdictions –
Germany and Israel), the study required a somewhat recursive
process. It called for extensive pretests for all eight governance
realms (four forms of governance X two jurisdictions). With
each pretest the study sought to identify measurable
governance points. For instance, a pretest probed the context
of “contracts” while examining which issues were addressed in
the firm’s terms of use. It later strove to match these issues
with relevant laws, technical measures and indications of social
norms (in the most elaborate part of the study, as detailed
65. See case studies discussed in Rubinstein & Good, supra note 34.
66. According to some reports, Israel has four million Facebook users as
of May 2013; 2.4 million Israelis use the social network every day. This leads
to a remarkable almost 50% level of Facebook usage in Israel (given a
population of around 8 million). Germany had 22 million Facebook users in
February 2014, and ranked second among European countries. Given
Germany's population of almost 81 million, Facebook's usage rate per capita
is roughly 27%. For Israel, see Omer Kabir & Meir Orbach, Facebook
Reveals: How Many Israelis Social Network Users?, CALCALIST [Hebrew] (May
21, 2013). For Germany, see European Union, INTERNETWORLDSTATS (Aug.
30, 2014 http://www.internetworldstats.com/europa.htm#de; see also sources
noted in Oermann et. al., supra note 1, at 5.
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below). After completing a basic round of pretests, the
researchers were able finally to focus their efforts on the issues
which overlapped in all eight governance realms tested, and in
that way effectively to compare them.
C. Measuring Social Norms: The Comparative Survey
Perhaps the most challenging segment of this study of
social media governance was the measurement of social norms.
It was resolved by an online survey conducted by sociologists in
Germany and Israel.67 To ensure that the issues examined
matched factors measured in other governance dimensions, the
survey was conducted last, although the prospect of the
upcoming survey guided the selection of issues examined in the
other three governance realms from the outset. For instance,
budgetary and other constraints, as well as the specific
expertise of the team members, limited the survey to Germany
and Israel. This in turn led to focusing the legal and
contractual analysis on frameworks pertaining to these two
countries as well. This explains why the study does not review
the very interesting U.S. governance landscape.
The survey’s text, which was applied (after painstaking
translation to both German and Hebrew) in both Israel and
Germany, was closely reviewed by all team members prior to
distribution. The survey, a questionnaire with 100 items, was
digitally distributed to 309 Facebook users aged 18-35 years in
Germany and Israel in October and November 2013. Overall,
the Israeli and German participants had similar demographic
characteristics, with slight differences.68 The survey, which
67. MESCH & SCHMIDT, supra note 11.
68. The average age of the respondents was 27.12 years (SD=4.48) in
Israel and 26.91 (SD=4.46) in Germany. The age difference was not
statistically significant. As to gender composition, the samples of both
countries were similar, 65% of the German sample were women compared to
53% of the Israeli sample. Regarding marital status, in Germany 88% of the
participants were single, while in Israel 57% reported not being married. In
terms of education, the samples were similar, as 52% of the Israeli sample
had a college or graduate education compared with 57 % in Germany. Most of
the respondents indicated that they access Facebook from home (93% in
Germany and 87.5% in Israel). As for daily use, there is a statistically
significant difference as Israeli users indicate they use Facebook on average
94 minutes a day and Germans only 52 minutes. Future study will examine
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took on average 47 minutes to complete, asked users about
their perception of descriptive and injunctive norms69 and the
extent of disclosure of personal information they engaged in on
Facebook.com.
The survey provided a rich array of findings on privacy
attitudes of Facebook users in Germany and Israel.70 It is an
important addition to a growing literature of recently published
surveys, all of which addressed these issues.71 But the survey’s
most salient (yet not necessarily apparent) innovative feature
is its overlap with measurable and noticeable governance
elements in the other dimensions. Accordingly, this survey will
no doubt promote the study of governance in social media.72
As a first step of such a study, this article examines its
perhaps most obvious findings – the points on which the study
demonstrates significant differences among the governance
realms. Thus, the discussion below focuses on one specific issue
which yielded significantly different results from the Israeli
and the German respondents: anonymity and the mandatory
use of “real names.” The analysis below briefly examines the
study’s overall interesting findings on this issue, the
differences among the various governance dimensions that
came to light, and their possible implications.
IV. Analyzing a Governance Choice: Anonymity vs. Real
Names

whether this difference had a substantial impact on the results.
69. For a discussion of the difference between these two sets of norms,
see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 17.
70. MESCH & SCHMIDT, supra note 11. For an additional discussion of the
survey, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 23, 32.
71. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROBAROMETER 359: ATTITUDES ON
DATA PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf;
see also Noellie Brockdorff & Sandra Appleby-Arnold, What Consumers
Think, Consent – Work Packages 7 & 8 (Mar. 2013), available at
http://consent.law.muni.cz/storage/1365167549_sb_consentonlineprivacyconfe
rencemarch2013-consentprojectresultswhatconsumersthink.pdf (a set of
surveys focusing on consumer sentiment regarding privacy in user-generated
content services).
72. For another paper resulting from this study, see Oermann et al.,
supra note 1.
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A. General
The Internet has famously promoted anonymous speech
and conduct. “On the Internet,” the famous cartoon averred,
“nobody knows you’re a dog.”73 Of course, this perception of
apparent anonymity is greatly distorted. Governments can,
and in many instances do, track the online discourse,
“connecting the dots” between the anonymous and actual
speakers. Commercial firms, especially those enabling the
online discussion, can do so as well, to some extent.74 However,
the online realm to some extent, still allows users to cloak their
identity in anonymity, at least to other users. Many websites
allow surfers to propagate ideas under a pseudonym, or
“handle.”75 The anonymity norm in online realms generates
various benefits, mostly in the form of extensive and
uninhibited speech. However, anonymity has been known to
generate detriments as well – especially hurtful speech aimed
at society’s weaker groups.76
Still, the anonymity of the online discourse is not set in
stone (or perhaps, code). In recent years, especially in some
realms involving social media, anonymity (even vis-a-vis other
online users) has been supplanted by “Real Name” policies.
The most recognizable example is the one applied by Facebook.
Individuals are required to use their “real” offline names when
registering for and interacting within this realm.77 The
practice has generated significant discontent (dubbed by some
the “Nym Wars”),78 but Facebook has not changed its policies.
It is not likely to do so in the near future, in view of the
presumed benefits that this identification strategy generates
73. Peter Steiner, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog, NEW
YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61.
74. See, e.g., There Is No Anonymity on the Internet, TEACHING PRIVACY
(2014),
http://teachingprivacy.icsi.berkeley.edu/theres-no-anonymity/.
75. Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1352.
76. Id. at 1362 (discussing such benefits and detriments), Ronen Perry &
Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech: Comparative and
Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 205, 206 (forthcoming, 2014), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2448706.
77. Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1352.
78. Id. at 1353.
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for Facebook’s bottom line.79
As noted, some critics have been quite vocal about the
adoption of “real name” policies in online social media, but it is
far from clear which form of identity management is
normatively superior at this juncture, or will prove to be just
and fair.
Both technological options – anonymity or
compulsory identification – could be normatively justified.80
Hence the governance of this specific trait of online social
media conduct seems fertile ground for empirical testing and
study, including an examination of subjective social norms.
Therefore, the eight dimensions noted above – law, contract,
code and social norms in the two legal and social jurisdictions
of Germany and Israel are addressed here accordingly. This
context also invites application of the theoretical background
noted above. For instance, given that “real name” policies
could be also considered (over-) protective of users (and not
only merely a measure to promote corporate objectives), the
rationales discussed pertaining to the acceptance or rejection of
governance by a “nanny corporation” should apply, and the
theoretical discussion of this concept could be examined in light
of empirical findings.
B. Governing “Real Names” – Law, Contract and Code
Law: The anonymous/pseudonymous vs. real names
governance context presents an interesting legal setting. It
brings to light differences between the two legal jurisdictions
the study chose to examine – Israel and Germany. This
distinction will prove helpful in the quest for normative and
operative conclusions, below. Israeli law treats the right of
anonymity with great respect. In one important Israeli
Supreme Court case regarding defamation, the need to protect
the right to anonymity, at least implicitly, led to the surprising
finding that the court had no authority to expose the identity of
79. Id. at 1356.
80. For some limited justification for the use of "real names" see
ZITTRAIN, supra note 5, at 228. For a debate on the suitability of possible
mandatory attribution as opposed to possible pseudonymity in the national
security context, see David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling
Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 531 (2011).
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online anonymous defendants.81 A subsequent case regarding
IP right recognized the rights of anonymous defendants in this
context as well, albeit less rigorously.82 Israeli courts, however,
have not objected to the use of “real name” policies as applied
by private actors. Nor are these issues addressed directly by
Israeli laws. So it is fair to assume that Israeli law takes the
position of weakly endorsing online anonymity.
The legal protection afforded anonymous speech is far
greater in Germany. German law provides strong rights
protecting the individual’s control over his or her identity. 83
More specifically, according to the German Telemedia Law,
consumers of online services are entitled, among other things,
to pseudonymous use of such services.84 The legality of
Facebook’s “Real Names” policy, which blocks the effective use
of pseudonyms, was recently examined by the German courts.
While the case was eventually dismissed upon appeal on
jurisdictional grounds (given that Facebook operates in
Germany as a company with headquarters in Ireland), the
lower court initially found that Facebook’s “Real Name” policies
were at odds with the noted provisions of German law.85 Also,
the proactive right to online pseudonymity in Germany has
been reflected in a national ICT project, namely the New
German ID card enables the use of a pseudonym.86 Thus it is
fair to conclude that German (as opposed to Israeli) law takes
the position of strongly endorsing online anonymity.
Code: throughout the Facebook social media platform, the
governance of “Real Names” through code takes a very
different turn from the interests reflected by law. Here, the
use of real names is deeply imbedded in the technological
interface. There is no significant difference between the
81. CA 4447/07 Rami Mor v Barak ITC – Int’l Telecomms Corp. 63(3) PD
664 [2010] (Isr.); see Perry & Zarsky, supra note 76, at 218.
82. CA 9183/09 The Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. John Doe
[2012] (Isr.); see Perry & Zarsky, supra note 76, at 219.
83. Zell, supra note 7.
84. Id. at 480.
85. Id. at 481.
86. See Marian Margraf, The New German ID Card, in ISSE 2010
SECURING ELECTRONIC BUSINESS PROCESSES 367, 368 (Norbert Pohlmann et
al. eds., 2011) ("the ID card must enable pseudonymous authentication");
Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1353.
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interface in Germany and in Israel on this point. Interacting
with Facebook, one is required to provide a “real name” during
registration. Naturally, the name of the specific user is
prominently displayed at various points within the social
media. Yet the most prominent way in which the notion of
exclusive usage of “real names” is governed is through
sanctions. Facebook can and at times does deactivate a user’s
account when suspecting that the “Real Name” policy is not
being followed.87 In addition, Facebook applies code-related
governance through peer-reporting mechanisms. The website
allows (and even encourages) users to notify the operator if
another user is applying a fake name – a notification measure
which could launch the code-related sanctions.88
Contract: As with code, the embedded contracts governing
the Facebook realm enable and enforce the usage of “real
names.” Facebook’s Israel-based website indicates in its terms
(which are in Hebrew, yet reflect the standard terms used
elsewhere) regarding “Security” that when registering a user
may not provide false information, and use only one account.89
Other provisions allow for the subsequent enforcement (via
code, as indicated above) of the rigid “real names” policy.90
Facebook’s German-based website carries similar provisions.
Importantly, however, it has several provisions written
specifically for Germany.91 These were most likely put in place
in view of a court case invalidating standard terms in online
service agreements – especially those pertaining to the
87. See for instance explanation on Why Was My Account Disabled,
FACEBOOK (2014), http://www.facebook.com/help/245058342280723/. For a
discussion of particular instances in which this sanction was applied, see
Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at 1336 (particularly discussing the facts
involving Salman Rushdie). For a discussion of a partial limitation on
exercising this right in Germany in view of a recent case, see infra note 92
and related text.
88. For Facebook's explanations as to how to use these buttons, see
Report
a
Violation,
FACEBOOK
(2014),
http://www.facebook.com/help/263149623790594/.
89. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK § 4 (Nov. 15,
2013), https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/.
90. Id. § 15.
91. Terms for Users Residing in Germany, FACEBOOK (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://www.google.com/translate?hl=en&ie=UTF8&sl=de&tl=en&u=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fterms%2Fprovisions%2Fgerman%2Findex.ph
p (translating http://www.facebook.com/terms/provisions/german/index).
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operating website’s ability to unilaterally terminate an account
without prior notice.92 However, these do not alter the
requirement of users to abide by the “real name” policy. The
amended provisions relevant to the issue at hand merely
somewhat dampen the harshness with which Facebook can
move to terminate the user’s account. They do, however, reflect
an example as to how contractual frameworks respond to
external events.93
To sum up the analysis thus far, in both jurisdictions the
analysis points to a divergence between the forms of
governance which originate from the firm (code and contract)
and the spirit of governance flowing from the state. It is
however clear that the divergence is greater in Germany than
in Israel (even after accouting for the recent changes in
contractual terms), given the difference between these two
legal systems. It will therefore be interesting to reveal the
direction taken by the governance rules derived from the
survey of the user’s social norms and what this might teach us.
C. “Real Names”: “Survey Says. . .”
Four survey questions pertained to users’ attitudes and
preferences regarding the use of pseudonyms and/or “real
names” on Facebook. Findings from all questions show a
statistically significant difference between German and Israeli
respondents. Table I below lists the questions and the average
responses given (as well as their standard deviation). The first
question was directly to the point, inquiring whether the use of
pseudonyms is acceptable on Facebook. Responses were scaled
92. For a discussion of this case, which pertained to the terms applied by
Google, see Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World
Wide Web: Reforming Social Networks' Contracting Practices, WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 53-54 (forthcoming 2015); see also Press Release, Federation of
German Consumer Organisations Wins Lawsuit Against Google (Nov. 19,
2013), available at http://www.vzbv.de/cps/rde/xbcr/vzbv/google-vzbv-pressrelease-2013-11-19.pdf; Karin Retzer, German Court Finds 25 Provisions in
Google’s Online Terms of Use and Privacy Policy to Be Unenforceable,
SOCIALLY AWARE BLOG (Dec. 19, 2013).
93. For a review of other instances where such changes unfolded, see
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Brendan Taylor, Set in Stone? Change
and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
240, 248, 268 (2013).
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from 0 (“never OK”) to 5 (“absolutely OK”). The second
question approached the same issue somewhat indirectly,
asking how many of the respondents’ Facebook contacts
considered their (the respondents) use of a pseudonym a
positive activity, in this realm. Responses were again from 0
(“none”) to 5 (“all”). For both questions, the average level of
agreement with the use of pseudonyms was higher in Germany
than in Israel. These results indicate a more permissive norm
in Germany supporting the use of Facebook without adhering
to its “real name” policy.
The next two questions took a different approach to this
issue (thus limiting the chance that any finding would prove
anecdotal). They focused on users’ concerns about falling for a
fake profile. Arguably, groups of users with a preference for
pseudonyms in social media would not consider this a serious
problem, and vice versa. This in fact proved to be the case.
Respondents provided answers regarding such fears resulting
from actions premised on fake profiles of both organizations
and individuals on a scale from 0 (“not concerned”) to 5 (“most
concerned”).
Again, there are statistically significant
differences between the countries, with Israelis indicating, on
average, a higher level of concern than Germans. This result
might be linked to the attitudes and preferences reflected in
the previous questions.
Israelis are less likely to use
pseudonyms on Facebook and therefore more concerned about
being defrauded by a fake person or organization.
From these survey results, it is possible to formulate a
tentative understanding of the form of governance social norms
would dictate for Facebook – one that would allow for the use of
pseudonyms online. The comparative perspective also shows
that German users have stronger attitudes and preferences for
the use of pseudonyms than their Israeli counterparts.

Table I: Summary of Relevant Survey Responses
Item

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/6
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(S.D.)

Response mean
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Thinking about
4.10
2.72
yourself, is it ok to
(1.18)
(1.35)**
use Facebook with a
pseudonym?
When thinking about 4.07
2.98**
your Facebook
(2.98)
(1.39)
contacts, how many
of them will think
positively of your
using Facebook with
a pseudonym?
How concerned are
2.13
2.43 **
you about falling for
(.93)
(.95)
a fake profile of an
organization on
Facebook?
How concerned are
2.10
2.32**
you about falling for
(.93)
(.99)
a fake profile of a
person on Facebook?
**p<.001 (statistical significance of difference in results).
Table II below sums up the analysis of the eight
governance dimensions examined above, while distinguishing
between Germany (DE) and Israel (IL). It indicates an
interesting story.
While the firm set an overall antipseudonym governance structure, the law in the two
jurisdictions differed. Before any examination of the nature of
social norms in these two countries, at least two hypotheses
could have been posited to predict the trajectory of the
(hypothetical form of) governance via social norms.94 One
would be an alignment of social norms with the norms chosen
by the firm (and implemented by code and contract) – as
opposed to those reflected in the selections made by the
government. The other would be an alignment of social norms
with those reflected by the law (and thus, government) and
opposed to those selected by the firm. The actual results from
94. For an additional discussion of instances where law and social norms
converge or diverge, see Oermann et al., supra note 1, at 36-37.
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the survey clearly demonstrate that the latter option
predominated; both Israeli and German respondents provided
answers which correlated with the norms reflected by the local
laws.
The comparative aspects of this study add an additional
set of findings indicating an association between governance by
law and social norms. It can be argued that this correlation is
the result of cultural differences in the conception of privacy in
the two countries. Thus, cultural differences in the conception
of privacy and personal disclosure possibly shape both the law
and the social norms of behavior on Facebook. Of course, one
might also argue that law shapes social norms, and vice versa.
Establishing these causal connections calls for additional
study, perhaps by examining changes in one of these factors
(such as a new law, or case) and their impacts. Yet lack of
certainty regarding these open questions need not undermine
the possible conclusions this study brings about, which are
presented in the next chapter.
Table II: The Governance of “Real Names” on Facebook
Code

Contract

Law

Social
Norms

DE

Implemented

Mandated

Strongly
object

Strongly
object

IL

Implemented

Mandated-* Weakly
Object

Weakly
object

* Some limited pro-user contractual language, in view of
legal changes.
V. Discussion of Results, Normative Conclusions and
Important Limitations
The case study presents interesting findings which could
be integrated in various ways. The article will now review
these findings and discuss two analytical issues. First, it
examines these findings in light of the above theoretical
discussion, pointing out which theories are strengthened and
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which are possibly refuted. Secondly, with regard to the
theoretical discussions in Part II.5 it strives to briefly
articulate the implications of the study’s findings in terms of
efficiency, fairness and justice.
An important caveat should be emphasized once more.
While the study can point to correlations and discrepancy
among the examined factors, it cannot identify the trigger for
such differences or the cause of these effects. Thus, the
conclusions below are presented cautiously, and can only
speculate about various causation theories explaining the
study’s findings.
One salient way to articulate these findings is to point out
that governance through social norms goes hand in hand with
that set out by government, and not that set out by the firm – a
result that emerged in both jurisdictions. At first glance such a
finding might seem trivial, even obvious. Should we not expect
laws and social norms to be aligned? This could be explained
either by the fact that citizens set the social norms and vote for
their government, which implements them. Or from a different
perspective, social norms are shaped by the existing law. In
addition, should we indeed be surprised that large firms ignore
both the law and their users’ preferences whenever possible,
and set out to apply governance rules tailored to solely promote
their own objectives?
As explained above, there was indeed reason to believe
that the realm of social media would provide results contrary to
such intuitions. Governance flowing from laws might prove
inappropriate by social standards, hence removed from social
norms, given the slow and rigid process of their acceptance,
lack of proper oversight and other detriments.95 On the other
hand, it is the firms that arguably have both incentives and the
ability to quickly meet their users’ social preferences, and alter
their governance models accordingly.
Yet the results indicate that contrary to these arguments,
governance through law and through social norms are closely
linked. Perhaps more important still, the social media do not
introduce a reality in which firms comply with their users’
social norms.
Therefore, these findings cannot validate
95. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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theories noted above regarding firms’ motivations to meet user
preferences. Rather, the empirical findings indicate that the
process of governance by code and contract is strictly top-down
rather than bottom-up.
The similar findings in both
jurisdictions strengthen this conclusion.
Returning to the theoretical discussion, the reason why
bottom-up processes ultimately did not unfold in this context
can be explained in several ways. First, it might be a result of
the firm’s global policy, which adopts a uniform framework and
chooses to ignore specific local governance initiatives. The
study’s findings cannot negate this theory. Note, however, that
the firm ignores local governance in two different geographical
realms – Israel and Germany, the latter being a substantial
state and also one for which Facebook chose to modify its
contract so as to cater to it in other contexts. Therefore, this
explanation might have limited force.
The difference between firm governance and the
governance by law and social norms might result from the
dearth of competition or high switching costs96 – both of which
are relevant to Facebook and probably other social media
platforms. When the firm’s users are unable to signal their
normative preferences, the firm moves to set governance rules
in ways which comply with their self-interest to maximize their
profit (rather than their users). However, the reason for the
perceived divergence of social norms from the firm’s
governance might be very different.
As Cass Sunstein
explains,97 the governance laid down by firms might indeed
result from a bottom-up process and in response to the users’
preferences. But the preferences given in the survey, which
possibly reflect the users’ thinking as citizens, are perhaps
different from their signaling and actions as consumers (or
perhaps as members of a new social category: internet users).
In that case the findings would indicate a very different form of
regulatory failure. Additional study is required to establish
which of these two general theories, or perhaps yet another
explanation, underlies the results.
The uncertainty regarding the reasons for the study’s

96. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
97. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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findings hampers the ability at this time to draw clear
normative conclusions regarding the proper governance setting
for social media. Nevertheless, the most likely conclusion of
this article’s analysis is that the firm’s managers dictate the
nature of governance, without properly considering the full
extent of their users’ preferences. This generates intuitive
discontent, which may be articulated on several analytical
levels. One is that of efficiency. Arguably, a firm engaging in
governance which counters its users’ preferences is inefficient.
Yet structuring an efficiency-related argument at this juncture
calls for an abundance of assumptions which go beyond the
confines of this article, especially considering the firm’s global
nature. True, it might be quite efficient for a global firm to
ignore the preferences of many of its users, given the costs of
catering to their specific needs.
An additional argument could be premised upon
autonomy,98 respect and violation of possible rights. Here one
might argue that the firm’s disregard for users’ rights and
preferences is normatively problematic. This issue too requires
extensive analysis and the formulation of various definitions in
this specific context of the various complex terms noted above,
and must be set aside for now as well. Accordingly, the article
will briefly examine the implications of the governance
dynamic described here in terms of fairness and justice, while
adhering to this law journal symposium’s overall theme.99
As explained above (in reference to Walzer’s work),100 a
reality in which those controlling the firm – hence the social
network platform – can unilaterally impact their users’ lives
and rights is arguably unjust.101 This is true regardless of the
98. For a definition of autonomy which might prove helpful for this
discussion, see GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20
(Sydney Shoemaker ed., 1988).
99. Symposium, Social Media and Social Justice, Pace Law School (Mar.
28, 2014).
100. See Henderson, supra note 37, at 1583.
101. When discussing injustice, an additional argument is often adduced
concerning injustice which might rise between different social segments.
Given that firms govern while adhering to their own interests, subjects are
left to face a grim reality. But some subjects are better off than others.
Social groups that obtain knowledge, wealth and power can ensure that their
preferences are met by exercising their influence and sophistication, while
weaker groups must comply with the initial rules under which they are
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firm’s global nature and other efficiency-related considerations.
The argument is strengthened by the fact that the aspects
controlled by the few are important and relate to crucial rights
such as privacy and identity.102 Furthermore, those in control
were not chosen nor elected by the public. Rather, and as
explained above, this small group leverages its control from one
set of contexts to another; it uses its control over the online
platform – a right related to property and contract – to enforce
a set of normative decisions in many walks of life.
The injustice could be resolved by limiting the firm’s realm
of influence and control, and assuring that governance in social
media reflects users’ preferences as well. The study indicates
that the current governance process does not yield this result.
On the other hand, the study further shows that local laws
have the potential of properly reflecting social norms.
Therefore, this injustice might be mitigated if governance by
law featured more prominently in the overall mix of
governance influences in the context of social media platforms.
This could be achieved by broader laws and stricter
implementation of rules that reject the firm’s attempts to
circumvent the relevant country’s jurisdiction.103
VI. Conclusions, Complications and Future Extensions
The comparative study presented above provides
substantial foundations for future research on social media
governance. A possible way forward on the basis of data
subjected. While this argument is often set forth in such situations, it is
difficult to apply it in the present context; it is indeed hard to see how
influence and sophistication will make a substantial difference in addressing
Facebook's harsh governance policies, through contract or code. One might
even note that those that belong to stronger groups have more to lose given
the application of "real name" policies. Given these difficult questions, this
argument is currently set aside.
102. For a discussion of the importance of identity and how it is related
to the use of "real name" policies, see Zarsky & Andrade, supra note 31, at
1360.
103. For instance, the actions of Facebook, as described in note 83 and
the relevant text. For a different recent example regarding Google (and
Google Spain), and how such an argument was rejected, see Case C-131/12,
Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. ¶
58-60.
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already collected pertains to the “right to be forgotten” –
individuals’ ability to mandate the deletion of information
pertaining to them from third-party datasets, even when such
data are accurate and complete. The governance-based study
examined this issue as well. It mapped out the forms of
governance unfolding with regard to code, contract and law. It
also included a relevant question in the survey. This question
too bore an interesting result, indicating a significant
difference between Israel and Germany. Table III notes the
question and the average responses in the two countries.
However, at the time of writing, this specific issue has
been subjected to a drastic change, which somewhat sets this
aspect of the research back.
This specific case-study
demonstrates the difficulty in researching such a dynamic
issue. In June 2014, the European Court of Justice ruled that
in many cases, and according to the EU Data Protection
Directive, individuals have the right to demand that a platform
remove and delete data at the data subject’s discretion, even if
they are correct and complete (yet possibly irrelevant at this
time).104 So the rule of law regarding the “right to be forgotten”
in both Germany and Israel (which is not subjected to the EU
Directive, yet is influenced by it) will possibly change further.
Moreover, regulation by code has changed as well. As the court
found that Google cannot escape EU jurisdiction on this
matter, Google was forced to react quickly.105 It did so by
creating an online form which allows EU users to request
removal of specific links, and has began to act on these
requests.106 It is most likely that social media platforms – not
only search engines – will alter their practices in view of this
ruling and Google’s actions. This might even impact public
opinion and social norms regarding this specific matter.107 In
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Mark Scott, Google Ready to Comply With ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
Rules
in
Europe,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
18,
2014,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/google-ready-to-comply-with-rightto-be-forgotten-rules-ineurope/.
107. For a very recent survey indicating popularity of the “right to be
forgotten” among American – a result which was not necessarily predictable,
see: DANIEL HUMPHRIES, SOFTWARE ADVICE, U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
'RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN: INDUSTRY VIEW (2014), available at
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view of this, the study’s current findings on the “right to be
forgotten” must be revisited. Still, the historical data gathered
in this study regarding the "right to be forgotten" issue will
make for a better understanding of the reasons for (or
causation of) the differences among governance models, should
these arise.
Beyond reliance on the study’s existing findings, the
project noted above sets forth an overall methodology for
studying the relations among various forms of governance. The
research group’s general aspiration is to expand this analysis
not only to broader privacy-related questions with regard to
digital media, but to issues of copyright policy and abusive
content as well. To that end, the theoretical assumptions on
the balance of the four governance models must be
reexamining and possibly recalibrated. Additional jurisdictions
will be examined as well, for a wider exploration of the
findings. In addition, I do hope that other scholars from a
variety of fields will choose (even partially) to apply this
methodology and contribute to a better understanding of the
crucial notion of governance in the digital age.
Table III: Social Norms and the Right to Be Forgotten
Item

Response mean
in Germany (SD)
3.41
(.87)

Response mean in
Israel (SD)
2.59**
(.98)

Respondents were
asked: How
concerned are you
that Facebook will
keep your personal
data even after
you delete your
account (“0” – not
concerned; “5” –
very concerned)
**p<.001 (measure of statistical significance).

http://www.softwareadvice.com/security/industryview/right-to-be-forgotten2014.
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